


**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	D/SOVA		X		
19	NIO/USSR		X		
20	NIO/SP		X		
21	D/EUR		X		
22			X		
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary  
3 Sep 87

Date

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Executive Registry

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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September 1, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: INF Basing Country Exchange of Notes with the  
Soviet Union (S)

After having taken fully into account the views expressed by agencies in the options paper of August 21 prepared by the INF Interdepartmental Group, the decision has been made that the United States Government will adopt the UK proposal for an exchange of diplomatic notes between INF basing countries and the Soviet Union. This decision is taken subject to the conditions that 1) the notes not interfere with INF Treaty obligations, 2) all five basing country notes be identical, and 3) the basing countries agree that the US will negotiate the notes with the Soviet Union. (S)

In further consideration of agency views on the text of the proposed letter from Secretary Shultz to Foreign Minister Howe, the Department of State, drawing upon the attached text, should dispatch such a letter to Her Majesty's Government as soon as possible. (S)



Colin L. Powell  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Attachment  
Tab A Letter to Foreign Minister Howe

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LETTER FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO FOREIGN MINISTER HOWE

Thank you for your letter of August 3 on our INF verification problem and your amplification of HMG's political need for a "direct link." I very much share your view of the importance of a common understanding between us, and I believe that this process of consultation, albeit prolonged, will contribute to a mutually satisfactory solution. I know you share our concern not to give the Soviet Union any excuse to avoid or circumvent any treaty obligations.

As you know, since we began consulting on this issue, the Soviets have agreed to global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems. This will enable us to: a) forego permanent monitoring of missile support facilities; b) restrict short notice inspections of suspect sites to the national territories of the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and c) restrict on-site inspection on the territory of basing countries to declared facilities for the duration of the elimination period (approximately three years).

This will greatly reduce the scope and duration of inspections in the UK. In view of these new circumstances, I hope that you will reassess the actual need for the "direct link" we have been discussing.

In previous discussions between our officials, we have pointed out the drawbacks associated with a direct link. I wish to emphasize two points that need to be taken fully into account. First, you and we have both strived throughout these negotiations to insist upon their bilateral nature. No matter how carefully we initially craft the notes, the process of negotiating their contents with the Soviet Union will introduce multilateral dimensions into the final agreement and its associated inspection provisions. Furthermore, the resulting set of accords could lead to a "conflict of treaties" situation. Applied to our inspection rights, such a situation could allow the Soviet Union to thwart our verification of the INF agreement using the guise of refusal by the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact basing countries to allow inspections. For example, they could cite some pretext connected with U.S. failure to respect East German or Czechoslovakian sovereignty, as we would be obligated to do under the inevitable parallel notes between ourselves and the Eastern basing countries. At the same time, the Soviets would claim to be in full compliance with all provisions of the INF Treaty itself.

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A second problem area that we must recognize is the possibility that negotiating an exchange of notes with the Soviets could lead to further demands that would be unacceptable both to you and to us. For example, under the global double zero treaty, we do not believe that there would be a need for suspect site inspection of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact basing countries and, hence, will propose that suspect site inspections be allowed only on Soviet and U.S. soil. The negotiation of an exchange of notes, however, could facilitate Soviet efforts to demand the right to suspect site inspections on your soil that go beyond anything that we have been prepared to discuss to date. This could prolong the negotiations and would play into the hands of the Soviets. In sum, pursuing a direct exchange of notes between your Government and the Soviet Union is not without risks.

Nonetheless, if you still believe a link is necessary, we will defer to your judgment on the understanding that the notes not interfere with obligations of the Treaty parties to each other, that the five basing country notes contain the same language, and that the basing countries agree to our negotiating the notes with the Soviets in Geneva.

I very much welcome your assurance that you have no desire to alter the draft Treaty and that you accept the exclusive responsibility of the United States for enforcing Soviet compliance. I am sure that you share our concern that an exchange of notes not alter the applicability of the Treaty and Inspection Protocol by suggesting that the application of the Treaty to INF systems located in the UK would flow from the exchange of notes rather than from the Treaty or that there would be direct accountability of the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom for Soviet inspectors during performance of activities permitted under the Treaty.

I therefore have taken the liberty of attaching alternative draft texts of the proposed basing country note and Soviet note in response. If you find these changes acceptable, we will be able to proceed on the basis of these texts and the understanding stated above.

I believe the close consultations we have had in the development of the Inspection Protocol and Model Basing-Country Agreements are cause for considerable pride. I look forward to the early resolution of this issue so that we may soon table out Inspection Protocol in Geneva.

Attachments:  
As stated

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DRAFT NOTE FROM BASING COUNTRY TO THE SOVIET UNION

I have the honour to recall that the Government of ((The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)) have been informed by the Government of the United States of America of the arrangements agreed between itself and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic for the verification of their mutual obligations with respect to the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missile systems as set out in the Treaty between them and the Inspection Protocol thereto and the application of these arrangements to intermediate-range nuclear missile systems of the United States located in ((the United Kingdom)).

As a strong supporter of balanced and verifiable measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, Government of ((The United Kingdom)) wholeheartedly endorse the said Treaty and Inspection Protocol. They have accordingly agreed to the application of the verification regime as aforesaid and have established by agreement with the Government of the United States the detailed modalities for that purpose.

I have the honour to inform you therefore that the

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Government of ((The United Kingdom)) are willing to accord to the Government of the Soviet Union and its duly authorized officials the inspection and verification rights provided for in the Inspection Protocol on receipt of an undertaking that the Government of the Soviet Union and its officials will, in relation to all activities to be carried out thereunder on the territory of ((The United Kingdom)) (including its airspace), comply with the terms of that Protocol, and that, except as agreed by ((The United Kingdom)), nothing herein shall affect the sovereignty of ((The United Kingdom)) and the enforcement of its laws and regulations within its territory.

I have the honour further to propose that the present Note and Your Excellency's reply to that effect shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force simultaneously with the above mentioned Treaty and shall remain in force for the duration thereof. The present agreement shall not however affect in any way the exclusive responsibility of the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the United States for the fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty and the Inspection Protocol.

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DRAFT SOVIET REPLY

I acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date. I have the honour in reply to express the appreciation of the Government of the Soviet Union for the sentiments expressed therein and for the willingness of the Government of the United Kingdom to facilitate the application to their territory of the verification arrangements in question. I have the honour further, in consideration thereof, to give Your Excellency the formal undertaking requested and to confirm that Your Excellency's Note and this reply will be regarded as constituting an agreement between our two Governments as proposed, which shall not affect in any way the matters referred to in the last paragraph of Your Excellency's Note.)

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